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# A DETECTION

OF THE

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*Massena de Ruvigny K*  
Earl of Gallway's  
CONDUCT at *Almanza*:

In the following

## Original Letters

Writ by

M. Schonenberg, the Dutch Ambassador at  
*Lisbon*, to the States.

The Count *de Noyelle*, the Dutch General  
in *Spain*, to M. Schonenberg.

Brigadier *Drinborn* (who was in the  
Battle) to Count *de Noyelle*.

The Count of *Cordona*, Governour of the  
Kingdom of *Valencia*.

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A  
**DETECTION**  
 OF THE  
*Earl of Gallway's*  
 CONDUCT at *Almanza, &c.*

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*M. SCHONENBERG's Secret*  
*Letter to the States, June 1.*  
 1707.

*My LORDS,*

**T**HO' I do not doubt but their High  
 Mightinesses shall have e'er this  
 Time received a very exact and par-  
 ticular Account of what happened in the Un-  
 fortunate Battle of *Almanza*, yet I am of  
 Opinion they will by no means find the Cir-  
 cumstances and Particulars mentioned in the  
 Three Letters hereunto annex'd, to be su-  
 perfluous.

perfluous. That under the Letter *A.* is an Original of the Count de *Noyelle*, writ to me, accompanied with a copious Relation of the Action under *B.* transmitted to his Excellency by Brigadier *Drinborn*, and the other under *C.* is an Extract and Translation of the Remarks made by the Count *Cordona* Governor of the Kingdom of *Valencia*, on my Lord *Gallway's* Conduct, in a Letter to King *Charles's* Minister residing here. From all which it plainly appears with what little Harmony, and how indiscreet Counsel, a Resolution so unnecessary, and yet of the highest Importance, was undertaken; with what blind Zeal and Confusion they carried it on, and with what fatal Success it was attended. It's moreover very remarkable, that we have not yet received in this Place as much as one Scrip of Paper either from the Marquess *Das Minas*, the Earl of *Gallway*, or the Baron de *Friesheim*; which makes us conjecture, that the Two last, at least my Lord *Gallway*, has sent directly an ample Relation of the Fight, by a Frigate, into *England*. To this give me leave only to subjoyn that by the several Advices we have received from very good Hands, out of divers Quarters; the Consternation among the respective Generals was so great, that they were almost all to pieces, and at their Wits end, they having with the few Infantry they had saved, and the undammaged *Portuguese* Cavalry, abandoned the Kingdom of *Valencia*, and retired towards *Tortosa* without disputing the Passage of the River *Joncar* with the Enemy, who have already penetrated as far



far as *Valencia*; and in all appearance the little Garrison left in the Castle of *Alicant* cannot long withstand them. In the mean time his Majesty has dispatch'd the Marquess *l'Encalada*, a *Spanish* Gentleman, into *Italy*, to solicit for a speedy and strong Reinforcement of Foot and Dragoons; with which the Imperial Court, notwithstanding the very pressing Necessity of it, and the Conveniency arising from the Nearness of the Expedient, perhaps has no Inclination to comply, and will presume it to be against their own particular Views in *Italy*, unless their High Mightinesses and her Majesty the Queen of *Great Britain* go roundly to work to hasten such a Reinforcement so greatly wanted in *Spain*. The same Marquess is also ordered, after he has dispatch'd his Business with the Duke of *Savoy* and Prince *Eugene*, to set forwards for the *Hague* and *London*, to represent the urgent Necessity of quick Supplies. As for this Court, they have been so far from imploying what Forces they have on this Side, to make a speedy and vigorous Diversion, in order to stop the Progress of the Enemy; that they on the contrary countermanded and sent back those Troops that were on the March from the Province of *Alentaja* to reinforce the Body of the Army about *Zuidad Rodrigo*, in order to cover, as much as possible, the Frontiers of *Algarve*, where the Enemies little Flying Camp under the Duke *d'Ossuna* have mastered the Town of *Serna*. Moreover, since the forementioned little Army has increased to about 5000 Men, Horse and Foot, though mostly Militia;

Militia ; and make a shew of penetrating farther ; I do my utmost by continual Representations to the Court to let them see, that by the junction of these Troops, and the Operations of such a Body of Men, the Frontiers on this side may not only be sufficiently secur'd, but also that this only Succour, which is yet at Hand, may seasonably contribute to redress our Affairs, against the Progress of the Enemy in *Valencia* and else-where, and oblige them to divide their united Force for the Defence of their own Country ; but that on the contrary, by separating of this Army, they would be so far from covering the Frontier Places of *Portugal*, that the Enemy would with more facility attack and master the remote Quarters one after another, and even pierce into the Heart of *Portugal*, without the least Stop or Diversion given to the Operations of their Grand Army against King *Charles*. All these, and several other convincing Arguments, make no Impression upon the faint-hearted and obdurate Counsels of the Ministers, who content themselves with protesting, that if *England* and the States do not send over speedy and large Succours, they shall not only be incapable here, of making a Diversion in favour of the Common Cause, but likewise be out of Condition to defend and secure themselves. I have so plainly and evidently set forth the cold Temper of this Council every Post-day this Year, as well as before, that it would be superfluous to trouble their High Mightinesses any more with it. Wherefore I re-  
commend

commend my self to their Favour, and leave it to their great Wisdom, Knowledge in Matters of State, and exemplary Zeal, to find out Expedients most suitable to the Good of the Common Cause, and the Service of our Country.

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*Count de NOYELLE's Letter to*  
*M. SCHONENBERG.*

*My LORD,*

**T**HE Letter you did me the Honour to write to me on the 29th of *March*, came safe to my Hands; and I have communicated to the King your Thoughts, in reference to what we are to expect on the side of *Portugal*. You will be surpriz'd with the ill News contain'd in the Papers I do herewith send you.

It's Matter of Astonishment, to find People without any Reason or Necessity march Four Leagues on purpose to find out an Enemy much stronger than themselves, very advantageously posted, and consequently ready to fight with all their Hearts; to change the Project that had been formed and approved of by the King, that the Army should march into *Arragon*, where there were Magazines already erected; where his Majesty was to appear in Person; and where being joined with 2000 Horse under the Command  
of



of Count *de les Pobla*, and 3 Dutch Battalions, they should have been at least equal to the Enemy.

But what will surprize you still the more is, that from the \* 25th of the last Month, on which the Battle of *Almanza* was fought, to this very Day, [May 6.] there has been no Account transmitted to the King from the General, which makes me believe they do not know what Turn to give it.

In short, my Lord, they have play'd the Fool with themselves, and we suffer here for it.

You may well conceive how they have exposed the Army and the King there; never did this Prince shew more Constancy than now, and he made a Virtue of Necessity; he has sent for a Reinforcement of Foot from *Italy*.

The Frontiers of *Valencia* and *Arragon* are in great Danger; and if those Gentlemen, with the remains of their Army, do not defend the Passages of the River *Cençar*; the First is lost, and the other Kingdom wherein there is no tenable Post, will be much exposed: We have not been wanting

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\* There is scarce such an Instance of Neglect as this to be met with in any Ancient or Modern History; and 'tis the more so, because the distance between *Almanza* and *Barcelona*, at the utmost, is not above Two Hundred and Fifty Miles.



ing to make necessary Representations to them, the result of which we do not yet know.

It has been proposed to send the *Dutch* and *Portuguese* Recruits, which were not in the Battle to *Valencia* and *Tortosa*.

It is absolutely necessary, that a Diversion should be now made on the side of *Portugal*, by which means the Enemy would be oblig'd to re-call the Troops which they drew from thence to this Frontier.

Finally, my Lord, we will do the best we possibly can; tho' after all, our best will be but bad enough.

I'll let you know the Consequences of such pernicious Management, and what Reason my Lord *Gallway* can give for so extravagant a Conduct.

I am,

*Barcelona,*  
*May 6.*  
1707.

C. DE NOYELLE.

B

Brigadier

*Brigadier DRINBORN's Letter*  
to Count DE NOYELLE.

My LORD,

I Do not doubt but the Baron *Friesheim* hath already transmitted unto your Excellency a Relation of the unhappy Battle of *Almanza*; which nevertheless was such, that I cannot, I am sure, be particular therein: Nay it's impossible for me to give your Excellency an exact Account of it. We quitted the Siege of the Castle of *Villena* on the 23d, having receiv'd Intelligence that the Enemy's Army was come to *Almanza*; and on the same Day, after we had withdrawn our Cannon and the Men, we marcht the 24th as far as *Candette*; and after a Resolution had been taken to attack the Enemy, notwithstanding their Superiority, who encamped Four Leagues from us, we began our March the 25th early in the Morning, and used such Expedition, that by Noon we entred into the Plain, by a Place called the Tower of Don *Henry*, and found the Enemy had not decamp'd, as we flatter'd our selves they would. We also then saw that their Army was join'd, and much stronger than we were: However we persisted in the Resolution to fight them; and our Army advancing on the Plain towards *Almanza*, my Lord *Gallway* with a Detachment possessed himself of some rising Ground, less than

than a Mile and a half distant from the Enemies Front; from whence he could plainly see their Army drawn up in order of Battle, having the Town of *Almanza* in the Rear of their main Body; which was so posted, that the Second Line was near the Walls, extending its right Wing on a rising Ground, and the left into a great Plain, having three Lines to the Wings, which were very close; we were ordered to extend our selves more and more towards the left; and seeing we were too weak to equal their Front, this Wing was reinforced with *das Minas's* Horse, that were drawn from the Second Line, which yet would not do: And as my Lord *Gallway's* Design was, he being then on our left, to hem in the Enemies right, by keeping us to extend our selves as we marched towards the left, with so much Precipitation, and without taking notice, that we did thereby make large intervals between our main Body and the Wing; yet we still prest on; and about Three the Fight began towards the left: The Enemy soon broke the *English* and *Portuguese* Dragoons, but they were brought into Order again. The main Body came to engage at the same time, so far as the *Portuguese*, who continued in the Rear, and our Infantry penetrated through the Enemies Body, entirely destitute of Horse to support them. I sustained the left Wing with the first Squadron of my own Regiment; we broke in upon them, and all that Battalion were made Prisoners, and their Colours

taken by my Troopers ; at the same time 2 other of the Enemies Battalions that they might succour their main Body which was then on the Rout, took my Squadron in Flank, whose Fire we bore, and then were obliged to succour the Battallion of *Welderren*, who fought with their wonted Valour. The *Portuguese* did not come on all the while, but we saw their Horse on the Right, who fell only upon Two or Three Squadrons. There was at that time on the Left no more than *de Nendes* and One or Two Battallions more, the Two Squadrons of *Harvey*, and my second Squadron, with the *Dutch* Dragoons, who being attacked by a treble Line of Foot and Horse, yet stood their Ground ; but the Infantry, after they had rallied three times, were broke in upon by the Enemy, and almost all slain ; so that our Troops being now cut off on all sides by the Flight of the Left Wing, we found it very difficult to save the rest of my Regiment, that of the Dragoons, and that of *Harvey's*, after we had charged divers times. In the mean time the Count *de Dona* had rallied the Remains of Fourteen Regiments, and we were informed next Day that he was retired to the Hills of *Don Henry*, and defended himself there. I went out with a small Detachment beyond *Catina*, because they flatter'd my Lord *Gallway* that he would defend himself still if he had but Provisions. The Intention was to see whether those Troops might be relieved ; but I soon learnt, that upon Summons they had



had surrendred, though upon a formal Capitulation, which was confirmed to us Yesterday by Count *Dona* and several other Officers. It is very strange that so small a Number should for so long a time resist the great Power of the Enemy; and some have assured me, that the Number taken in this Place did not exceed 1500 Men. As for all the rest of our Infantry, we have no more here than those who guarded the Baggage, the Sick and the Wounded in the Action at *Catania*. I have found 147 wounded and recovered; this is the sad Condition of our Army. We shall leave some Men in Garrison here, and as for the rest I cannot tell what they will do, and how they will save themselves. There is still above 100 good Horse in my Regiment, and several wounded. Certainly there was never such a piece of Work in the World as we have made of it. I was not of the Council of War, as not having received my Commission for a General Officer; but I cannot understand how those who have been the Cause of this Misfortune can answer for it. However, I shall not enlarge upon this Head, but wish with all my Heart I could speak in Person to your Excellency; there is an absolute Necessity for it, and to that end I endeavoured to go towards *Catalonia*; but the Baron *de Friesheim* not allowing me that Liberty, this has put me upon writing in this manner, being very sorry I could not do it sooner. The Evil is irremediable, and I look upon our Affairs to be ruined; and  
I am

I am farther afraid, when I consider the State and Management of our Affairs, that they will be attended with more fatal Consequences. The Recruits are sent towards *Tortosa*, and Monsieur *Friesheim* told me that he would have them incorporated with our *Arragon* Battalions. Your Excellency knows much better than I after what manner, if it be possible, this Misfortune may be a little redressed. My Lord *Gallway* has a broken Pate, *Das Minas* is Sick, and *Friesheim* knows not what to do in this Extremity. I wish I could have sent better News to your Excellency, but God has ordered it otherwise, and the Blindness of our People was the Cause of it.

*Alcira, April*  
30. 1707.

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*Count of CARDONA's Letter from*  
*Valencia, May 2. 1707.*

WE find our selves at this time full of Regret by reason of the bad Success of our Arms in the Battle of *Almanza*, which might have been very easily avoided, could the over Eagerness of the Earl of *Gallway* for it have been diverted; but the Matter was carried so far, that neither the several Advices of the Officers the Day before, nor those of the Country People, which confirmed

med the former, were any ways available towards making him alter his Design. However the greatest Fault by no means consisted in rejecting the several Informations given him, but in not falling upon the Enemies Flank, which might have easily been done. This Oversight, together with the great Interval in the middle of the main Body, gave the Enemy an Opportunity to improve it to their own Advantage, and wholly to cut off our Right Wing, as it actually happened; the Consequences, of which was, that all the Cavalry fell upon the Infantry, now totally abandoned, and at last cut them almost all down to the Ground.

This unhappy Miscarrirge was such as may justly make us fear mor fatal Consequences than at present we can well imagine.

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*FINIS.*





THE OCEANIC